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Abstract—SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisi-
tion) systems are used for controlling and monitoring industrial
processes. We propose a methodology to systematically identify
potential process-related threats in SCADA. Process-related
threats take place when an attacker gains user access rights
and performs actions, which look legitimate, but which are
intended to disrupt the SCADA process. To detect such threats,
we propose a semi-automated approach of log processing. We
conduct experiments on a real-life water treatment facility. A
preliminary case study suggests that our approach is effective in
detecting anomalous events that might alter the regular process
workflow.
I. INTRODUCTION
SCADA systems can be found in critical infrastructures
such as power plants and power grid systems, water, oil and
gas distribution systems, building monitoring (e.g., airports,
railway stations), production systems for food, cars, ships
and other products.
Although failures in the security or safety of critical in-
frastructures could impact people and produce damages to
industrial facilities, recent reports state that current critical
infrastructures are not sufficiently protected against cyber
threats. For example, according to Rantala [26], around 2700
organisations dealing with critical infrastructures in the U.S.
detected 13 million cybercrime incidents, suffered $288 mil-
lion of monetary loss and experienced around 150 000 hours
of system downtime in 2005. Also, in a security study of
291 utility and energy companies in the U.S. [14], 67% of
the companies report that they are not using state of the art
security technologies. Besides, 76% of the companies report
that they suffered one or more data breaches during the past
12 months.
The increasing number of security incidents in SCADA
facilities is mainly due to the combination of technological
and organizational weaknesses. In the past, SCADA facilities
were separated from public networks, used proprietary soft-
ware architectures and communication protocols. Built on
the “security by obscurity” paradigm, the systems were less
vulnerable to cyber attacks. Although keeping a segment of
communication proprietary, SCADA vendors nowadays in-
creasingly use common communication protocols and com-
mercial off-the-shelf software. Also, it is common to deploy
remote connection mechanisms to ease the management dur-
ing off-duty hours, and achieve nearly-unmanned operation.
Unfortunately, the stakeholders seldom enforce strong se-
curity policies. User credentials are often shared among
users to ease day-to-day operations and are seldom updated,
resulting in a lack of accountability. An example of such
practice is the incident in Australia when a disgruntled (for-
mer) employee used valid credentials to cause a havoc [32].
Due to these reasons, SCADA facilities became more
vulnerable to internal and external cyber attacks. Although
companies reluctantly disclose incidents, there are several
published cases where safety and security of SCADA were
seriously endangered [27].
Like a “regular” computer system, a SCADA system
is susceptible to threats exploiting software vulnerabilities
(e.g., protocol implementation, OS vulnerabilities). How-
ever, a SCADA system is also prone to process-related
threats. These threats take place when an attacker uses valid
credentials and performs legitimate actions which can dis-
rupt the industrial process(es). Process-related threats also
include situations when system users make an operational
mistake, e.g, when a user inputs a wrong value (e.g., a highly
oversized value) for a given device parameter and causes
the failure of the process. In general, process-related threat
scenarios do not include any exploit of a software imple-
mentation vulnerability (e.g., protocol implementation).
Sometimes system- and process-related threats can be part
of the same attack scenario. For example, an attacker can
first subvert the access control mechanism to gain control
over an engineering work station. This action would use a
system-related threat (e.g., exploiting an OS vulnerability).
Then, an attacker could use a valid SCADA control appli-
cation to perform undesirable actions for the process (e.g.,
overload pipe system). This part of the attack is performed
as a process-related threat scenario.
Traditional security countermeasures, such as intrusion
detection systems, cannot detect, let alone mitigate, process-
related threats. This is because typical intrusion detection
systems look for patterns of the behaviour known to be mali-
cious (e.g., known payload transfers, TCP header format) or
look for anomalies in terms of statistical distributions (e.g.,
by statistically modeling the content of data packets). The
anomalies generated by process-related threats are typically
not reflected in communication patterns/data (e.g., injection
of executable code to exploit a buffer overflow sent within
network traffic data), and can only be detected by analysing
data passed through the system at a higher semantic level. To
understand the higher semantic level from network data, a
protocol parser has to be used, such as in Bro [24]. Similarly,
for host-based analyses, understanding the specific SCADA
application is crucial.
Other approaches for monitoring SCADA behaviour in-
clude the usage of field measurements or centralised SCADA
events as information resources. Field measurements rep-
resent raw values coming from field devices. Aggregated
field measurements can provide information about the cur-
rent status of the process. However, we argue that the field
measurement values are too low level to extract user actions
and to evaluate the semantics of the performed actions.
SCADA event logs provide a complete high-level view
on the industrial process that is continuous over time and
captures information about user activities, system changes
in the field as well as system status updates [31].
Problem: Even a SCADA system used in a small instal-
lation generates thousands of potentially alarming log entries
per day. Thus the size (and high dimensionality) of logs
make manual inspection practically infeasible.
This is a relevant and challenging problem to tackle. It
is relevant because process-related threats affect the security
and safety of critical infrastructures, which in turn could
endanger human life. It is challenging because in the past
the analysis of system logs has been applied to other secu-
rity domains (e.g., in [15]) but failed to deliver convincing
results.
We propose a semi-automated approach of log processing
for the detection of undesirable events that relate to user
actions.
We acknowledge that the success of a log mining ap-
proach depends on the context in which it is applied [23].
Therefore, we perform an extensive analysis of the problem
context. In Figure 1 we show the main steps of the our
approach. We group the steps by two means of obtaining
context information: (1) system analysis and (2) analysis by
a focus group. The system analysis implies the inspection of
available documentation and processing of logs. The focus
group analysis implies sessions with the stakeholders where
we obtain deeper insights about the SCADA process. Fo-
cus groups consist of process engineers who are aware of
the semantic implications of specific actions, but typically
cannot provide useful information for automatic extraction
of log entries. This is due to the fact that engineers do not
perform extensive analysis of system outputs and are not
experts in data mining. On the other hand, by performing the
system analysis, we cannot infer semantic information that
is implied in log entries, thus the stakeholders’ knowledge
is invaluable.
A sequence of actions in Figure 1 represents the chrono-
Figure 1. Steps for mining SCADA logs
logical order of the steps that we perform. In steps 1 and
2 we systematically identify process deviations caused by
user activity. For this we adapt two methodologies from the
domain of hazard identification (PHEA and HAZOP [8]).
We then use the stakeholders knowledge to identify which
of the analysed deviations represent a legitimate threat to the
process (step 3). In steps 4 and 5 we perform log transfor-
mation and generalisation to extract a subset of log attributes
suitable for log mining. Also, we discuss the requirements of
the mining algorithm that is useful for our context. In steps
6 and 7 we include the stakeholders in the mining process.
This implies leveraging the stakeholders’ knowledge about
the process to improve the semantics of the mined events.
The stakeholders analyse the output of the mining process
and verify anomalies. Finally, the anomalies are checked for
the consistency with the threats identified in step 3. Also,
this step is used to revise the list of potential threats and
perhaps introduce new threats.
To support the proposed analysis, we build a tool that
can perform the log processing in search for process-related
threats. Our tool leverages a well-known data mining al-
gorithm to enumerate (in)frequent patterns within a given
set. Despite being quite simple and straightforward, our
benchmarks show that the chosen algorithm is effective in
detecting previously overlooked behavioral anomalies.
Contributions: The main contributions of this paper are
the following:
 we propose a new methodology to identify and analyse
process-related threats caused by the activity of users,
 we propose an approach to detect process-related
threats and build a tool to automate the analysis
of SCADA logs, which can be used to monitor the
industrial process,
 we perform experiments to validate our approach using
data from a real facility.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section
II we describe a typical SCADA system. Section III de-
scribes the performed threat analysis (steps 1, 2 and 3 from
Figure 1). Section IV describes our approach and step 4
in Figure 1). In Section V we discuss the algorithm choice
(step 5) and describe the architecture of our tool. Section
VI describes steps 6 and 7. Related work is presented in
Section VII. Finally we present our conclusions and future
work directions in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we explain how a typical SCADA system
works. A SCADA system consists of two main domains: the
process field and a control room (Figure 2).
Large systems may have more than one control room.
The network infrastructure binds the two domains together.
SCADA users control the industrial process from the control
room and are provided with a real-time overview of the
process field device parameters (data about tank loads, pump
statuses, temperatures, etc).
Depending on the underlying process, SCADA systems
differ from each other. For example, a power-related SCADA
installation contains power switches and transformers while
a water-related installation contains water pumps and valves.
However, based on interviews with the stakeholders (who
represent process engineers, operators and computer network
experts from 4 different facilities), we believe that the com-
puter systems controlling these processes behave in a similar
way.
Figure 2. SCADA system overview: control room and process field
A. System architecture
Despite the fact that there are different vendors, the sys-
tem architectures in various SCADA systems are similar and
the terminology is interchangeable. Figure 3 shows a typical
SCADA layered architecture. Layer 1 consists of physical
field devices, PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) and
RTUs (Remote Terminal Units). The PLCs and RTUs are
responsible for controlling the industrial process, receiving
signals from the field devices and sending notifications to
upper layers. Layer 2 consists of SCADA servers responsible
for processing data from Layer 1 and presenting process
changes to Layer 3. Connectivity Servers aggregate events
received by PLCs and RTUs and forward them to SCADA
users in the control room. The Domain Controller in Layer
2 holds local DNS and authentication data for user access.
The Aspect Server is responsible for implementing the logic
required to automate the industrial process. For example,
an Aspect Directory in the Aspect Server holds informa-
tion about working ranges of the field devices, the device
topology, user access rights, etc. Besides, the Aspect Server
collects and stores data from the Connectivity Servers into
audit and event logs. The various clients in Layer 3 represent
SCADA users.
Figure 3. SCADA system layered architecture
B. System users in process control
There are two kinds of SCADA users: engineers and
operators. An engineer is responsible for managing object
libraries and user interfaces, setting working ranges for de-
vices, defining process setpoints, writing automation scripts,
etc. An operator monitors the system status and reacts to
events, such as alarms, so that the process runs correctly
(Figure 2). Typical operator actions, depending on the under-
lying industrial process, include commands such as: change
switch status, increase temperature, open outlet, start pump.
Although industrial processes in various domains differ in
the details (or some user roles may be assigned to external
parties such as vendors), the user interaction with a SCADA
system is broadly similar. Our stakeholders acknowledged
that an engineer is a more powerful system user than an op-
erator (e.g., an engineer writes scripts that define process au-
tomation while operators usually only run the script). Also,
operators perform actions that are predefined by engineers
(e.g., an engineer defines pump speed range, while an oper-
ator works within the range only). This means that operator
actions are security and safety constrained depending on the
way the engineer implemented safety controls. By contrast,
there is no mechanism that will ensure that engineer actions
are safe for the process (e.g., an engineer can, by mistake,
assign a capacity 10 times bigger than in reality to a tank,
and thus shut tank level alarms off). Although individual
operator actions are legitimate and should be safety con-
strained, the stakeholders acknowledge that a sequence of
operator actions can still produce damage to the process.
C. System logs
System logs capture information about process activ-
ity. Depending on the size of the facility, a SCADA sys-
tem records thousands of events per day. Such events de-
scribe system status updates, configuration changes, condi-
tion changes, user actions, etc.
Generally, a user action leaves a trace in the log on two
ways: (1) as a direct action (e.g., the exact user action of
performing a reconfiguration) or (2) as a consequence (e.g.,
an consequence of a performed action or a sequence of
actions-process script). The first type of trace implies a log
entry that captured the time, the location and the user name
of the person who performed the action.
The second type of trace implies an indirect action con-
sequenc or system response. Although caused by a user
action, this trace typically does not consist of user name
who performed the initial action nor the location of the
failure source. This is because the captured trace does not
represent the source but the victim of the specific action that
propagated [13], [22].
SCADA system already use logs during operation. In par-
ticular, engineers compile alarm triggers and thus highlight
specific events during operation. For example, an alarm trig-
ger is designed to go off when a specific field value reaches
the threshold (e.g., tank level less than 100L). This is good
because users can define known malicious behaviours to be
alerted. However, such alarms cannot extract events that are
unexpected compared to usual patterns of behaviour.
In the next section we analyse potential threats that can
occur in a SCADA environment.
III. THREAT ANALYSIS
We classify possible threats against SCADA systems in
two groups: system- and process-related. System-related
threats typically exploit software/configuration vulnerabili-
ties (e.g., a buffer overflow or a flaw in a communication
protocol [4]). Such attacks are low level and typically occur
at Layer 1 and Layer 2 of the SCADA architecture (Figure
3).
On the other hand, process-related threats exploit weak
process controls, and imply that an attacker obtains (e.g.,
through social engineering) user access rights and issues
legitimate SCADA commands to to distupt the industrial
process. We analyse process-related threats during a focus
group session with stakeholders. Based on two possible
places where a SCADA user interacts with the process, we
distinguish two types of process-related threats: (1) threats
that leverage access controls on field devices and (2) threats
that leverage vulnerabilities of the centralised SCADA con-
trol application. The first type of threat typically results in
sending bad data to the SCADA state estimation which can
then produce errors in system state analysis [19]. The second
type of threat includes scenarios of performing legitimate
user actions (from the control application) that can have
negative impact on the process production or devices. In this
paper we focus on the second type of process-related threats.
These attacks are high level (occur via the process control
application) and typically relate to user actions (Layer 3 on
Figure 3).
A. Identification of process-related threats
To identify process-related threats in SCADA, we analyse
user activities in SCADA control software. We describe user
activities as actions that are (1) performed by a signed-on
user or (2) performed on a known user workstation. We anal-
yse the threats that leverage legitimate system commands
performed by a legitimate user, or by an illegitimate user
who has managed to obtain valid credentials. Our focus is
on the threats that can be triggered by a single user action
(i.e., we do not analyse sequences of actions). Based on
interviews with the stakeholders, we distinguish two threat
scenarios, namely (1) an attacker impersonates a system user
or (2) a legitimate system user makes an operational mistake.
To identify process-related threats, and the leveraged vul-
nerabilities, we analyse a real-life SCADA system control-
ling a water treatment facility located in the Netherlands.
1) Methodology: We combine two known methodolo-
gies to systematically identify process-related threats. Those
are: PHEA (Predictive Human Error Analysis) and HAZOP
(Hazard and Operability Study) [8]. PHEA takes a user-
oriented approach to analyse human errors by building a task
analysis tree. The task tree consists of possible user actions
in the specific system. We use the PHEA tree to represent
possible user actions in a SCADA system. Originally, PHEA
analyses the tree using the human error classification (e.g.,
an action is taking too long, an action is performed incom-
plete [8]) to identify potential threats for every action in the
tree. This part of the analysis is not suitable in our case.
The reason for this is that our goal is to identify actions that
produce malicious consequences on the process, whereas
PHEA originally focuses on identifying possible causes of
human errors. To identify possible misuses of user actions
(on the PHEA tree) we use the HAZOP methodology.
HAZOP is the best documented methodology for address-
ing process safety problems [8]. The methodology requires
that, for every specific context, a set of process keywords
and a set of process guidewords is defined. The process
deviations (e.g., temperature decrease) are built by combin-
ing chosen process keywords (e.g., temperature, pressure,
power) and process guidewords (e.g., increase, decrease, go
reverse). All deviations are then analysed to identify the
severity, effects and possible mitigation strategies. As a re-
sult, some deviations are ruled out as noncritical while others
are highlighted and presented as potential threats.
We implement the combined methodology in two steps.
First, we build a task analysis tree (as in PHEA). Our
tree consists of possible user tasks within a SCADA cus-
tomized Aspect Directory. Figure 4 represents a part of an
anonymised and simplified AD of the stakeholder company.
Figure 4. Part of the AD in a working SCADA facility for water treatment
Second, we perform the HAZOP step. We compile a spe-
cific set of keywords and guidewords for our application
context. The leaves of the PHEA tree represent HAZOP
keywords (such as pumps, tanks). In the analysed facility,
there are 36 different keywords. The keywords are compiled
(and generalised) from the AD tree of object paths. We
describe the tree generalisation process in Section V-C. By
performing this step we increase the level of abstraction in
the analysis. For example, instead of analysing deviations
for each specific device (e.g., PUMP1, PUMP2, PUMP3),
we analyse deviations for a group of same devices (pumps).
The SCADA control application allows a user to perform
only three distinct operations: add, modify and delete. We
use these operations as HAZOP guidewords. Following the
concept of the HAZOP methodology, we build process de-
viations for all possible combinations of given keywords
and guidewords. Table I shows examples how deviations are
generated. The first column of the table consists of all chosen
keywords (leaves of the PHEA task analysis tree from Figure
4). The second column consists of three guidewords. Each
keyword from the first column is combined with all three
guidewords from the second column to build a deviation
in the third column. The character of the specific devia-
tion depends on the position of the keyword in the tree.
Typically, one keyword can be found on several branches
of the AD tree (e.g., in Figure 4 keyword tanks). A de-
viation built on the keyword tanks in the Plant1/Functional
mode/Street2/Devices/Operational parameters/Groups of de-
vices/tanks branch of the tree implies actions on opera-
tional parameters of the device such as capacity, desirable
tank level, etc. Such devised deviations are: a user mod-
ifies the capacity of tank, a user modifies the value of
the desirable tank level. Deviations of the same keyword
from a different branch of the tree imply different types of
actions. For example, keyword tank in the Plant1/Control
module/Production/Cleaning/ Alarm settings/ Groups of de-
vices/Tanks branch of the tree implies operations on alarms
that relate to tanks (e.g., add alarm, modify alarm, delete
alarm).
The enumeration of possible actions of each keyword in
various branches of the tree represents specific, application-
dependant knowledge. We believe that such extensive de-
scription is not interesting for this paper.
2) Identified threats: The HAZOP step of the methodol-
ogy in our case comprises 108 combinations of keywords
and guidewords. However, depending on the context (i.e.,
the specific software control implementation), some com-
binations do not apply (e.g., operational parameters cannot
be deleted, an item on the access list can only be added or
deleted but not modified). This way, together with the stake-
holders, we decrease the total number of deviations to 72.
Finally, during a focus group session with the stakeholders
we analysed 35 deviations. For all compiled deviations we
perform a detailed analysis to define the cause, effects and
mitigation recommendations. Table II shows the results of
the detailed analysis of three deviations.
After analysing causes and effects, the stakeholders la-
belled 18 deviations as potential threats. We distinguish two
types of threats: scripting errors and misconfiguration. Both
types of threats typically originate from the activity of engi-
neers. The threats exploiting a scripting error imply writing
(and loading) faulty process automation scripts or leveraging
scripts already developed by system engineers. A misconfig-
Table I
IDENTIFIED SYSTEM DEVIATIONS CAUSED BY USER ACTIVITY
Keyword Guideword Deviation / Potential threat
add a user adds a a valve to the group
Valve modify a user modifies the name of a valve
(topology)1 delete a user deletes a valve from the
group
add no
Tanks modify a user modifies the capacity of tank
(e.g., the capacity of tank is in-
creased by double)
(operational
parameters)2
delete no
add a user adds action type to the al-
lowed actions (e.g., a user adds ”in-
serting setpoint” and/or ”changing
pump status” to the list of allowed
operator actions on a pump)
Pumps modify no
(access
settings)3
delete a user deletes action type from al-
lowed actions (e.g., a user deletes
”inserting setpoint” and/or ”chang-
ing pump status” from operator ac-
tions on a pump)
1 Plant1/Control module/Topology/Groups of devices/Valves
2 Plant1/Functional mode/Street2/Devices/Operational
parameters/Groups of devices/Tanks
3 Plant1/Control module/Production/Cleaning/Access settings/Groups
of devices/Pumps
Table II
UNDERSTANDING MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Guideword MODIFY - An engineer modifies the
quantity value of chemicals (e.g., input 2).
Cause Inside/outside malicious attackHuman error
Effects
Errors in calculations
Equipment damage
Influence the product quality
Recommendations Additional input checksTrack user behaviour
Guideword DELETE - An engineer deletes a device
from the device topology (e.g., a pump 13)
Cause Inside/outside malicious attackHuman error
Effects
Device becomes inaccessible
Equipment damages due to overload
Inconsistent alarms
Recommendations
Increase the number of access levels
Track user behaviour
Safety checks on engineer actions before
execution
Guideword MODIFY - An engineer modifies a tank
capacity (e.g., tank 1).
Cause Inside/outside malicious attack
Human error
Effects
Tank damage due to overload
No alarm when real maximum reached
Damage of interdependent equipment
Recommendations
Include safety checks during manual work-
ing mode
Additional configuration checks
Track user behaviour
Table III
IDENTIFIED PROCESS-RELATED THREATS AND THREAT EXAMPLES IN
THE SYSTEM CONTEXT
Type of threat Threat Example
Scripting error An engineer loads a
script that causes er-
rors in the system au-
tomation
An engineer inserts a
wrong ratio of chem-
ical components
Misconfiguration
/functional
An engineer modifies
a device parameter
Change capacity of
a tank to prevent
the alarming system
from going off
Misconfiguration
/functional
An engineer modifies
auditing policy
Turn off all auditing
Misconfiguration
/control
An engineer modifies
the range of allowed
actions for a specific
device
A pump cannot be
any longer stopped
Misconfiguration
/control
An engineer modifies
the system topology
Some devices
become invisible,
and thus inaccessible
uration implies forcing the settings of unsafe configurations.
Examples of the identified threats are presented in Table III.
After the performed analysis, together with the stakehold-
ers we discuss possible methods for mitigating the identi-
fied threats. In particular, we analyse if the current SCADA
application can apply to identified threat recommendations
(Recommendations in Table II). To this end, we compile a
list of vulnerabilities in the system that relate to the identified
threats:
 no process safety checks are in place during the manual
system mode;
 an input is not validated before executing an engineer
command;
 weak password policy;
 no detail operator auditing;
 limited separation between production and administra-
tion (no principle of least privilege: e.g, at the same
time, an engineer has access rights to both process
configuration and user-account administration).
Due to the apparent mismatch between the current system
features and the devised recommendations, we acknowledge
that the current SCADA application lacks controls to detect
the identified threats.
We discuss two ways of mitigating identified threats: (1)
by upgrading the proprietary SCADA software to support
additional functionalities (such as an additional input check
in manual mode or by introducing safety checks for engineer
actions before execution) and (2) employing an independent
tool to analyse data resources from SCADA and detect ma-
licious behaviour.
We choose to build a tool to analyse and identify unde-
sirable behaviours.
IV. MITIGATION APPROACH
We propose an approach to detect process-related threats
based on an automated way of processing SCADA logs. Our
goal is to identify the most interesting events from the logs,
and thus allow operators to focus on a set of potentially
suspicious events than can be inspected manually. To this
end we built a tool called MELISSA (Mining Event Logs
for Intrusion in SCADA Systems).
We argue that, due to the size and complexity, manual
inspection of SCADA logs is infeasible. Automated filtering
of interesting events may provide some results. In Section
II-C we describe that user actions may leave a trace in two
ways: as a direct user action and as a consequence. The
threats identified in Section III-A2 directly relate to user ac-
tivity. Such user actions could be detected by implementing
the following filters:
 extract entries which include a signed on engineer,
 extract entries that are performed on critical worksta-
tions (e.g., main system server),
 extract entries that are performing an action on a critical
path of the Aspect Directory (e.g., reconfiguration in
access settings)
However, the extraction of action consequences is diffi-
cult. This is because the prediction of potential consequences
of a performed action and the propagation of such con-
sequences is not straightforward as it implies an in-depth
analysis of process dependencies.
We argue that detecting direct user actions solely might
not reveal the undesirable character of the user action. For
example, a user might write an erroneous (or malicious)
script that produces postponed faults in the system. The act
of writing a script is not unusual (and is typically scheduled),
thus the log trace of the action is legitimate. Therefore,
a rule-based approach would either: (1)raise an alert and
be cleared by the operators as legitimate or (2) not raise
an alert at all. However, the script might produce indirect
consequences (or faults) that are undesirable for the process
work. Due to the fact that the enumeration of all possible
faults that a script might trigger is typically infeasible, such
fault would not be detected.
Thus we believe that SCADA logs should also be pro-
cessed in a heuristic approach. In contrast to the rule-based
approachers, this approach implies that models of normal
and anomalous behaviour are derived automatically.
We argue that the content of SCADA logs seldom changes
over time. This is because usually new devices are not fre-
quently added (or removed), operators and engineers repeat
a finite set of actions, the system is semi-automated, etc.
Some events are highly frequent (e.g., one event repeated
1,115 times in 8 hours of plant work in the log). Due to
these reasons, we believe that the pattern-based analysis of
system behaviour is suitable for the SCADA context.
The basic idea of our approach is that a frequent be-
haviour, over an extended period of time, is likely to be
normal because event messages that reflect normal system
activity are usually frequent [3], [20], [35].
Similar to the authors in [7], we found a large fraction
of events that always appear with the same number of daily
occurrences (e.g., timer-triggered event). Thus, a rare event,
in a semi-automated and stabile environment as SCADA, is
likely to be anomalous. For example, an engineer operating
from a machine that is usually inactive outside the working
hours is considered suspicious.
Our analysis consists of pattern mining on SCADA logs.
To do that we translate SCADA log entries into patterns.
Figure 5 depicts the relation between a log entry, an itemset,
an item and a pattern. Each unique log entry, with several
attributes, represents a single itemset (Figure 5.A). A unique
value of an attribute in the log entry represents one item.
A support count is the number of log entries that contain
the given itemset. Formally, if the support count of an item-
set I exceeds a predefined minimum support count threshold,
then I is a pattern [11]. In Figure 5.A, log entries 2 and 3
are the same, thus the corresponding pattern has the support
count 2 (Figure 5.B).
Figure 5. Log translation: A) mapping log entries into itemsets and items,
B) mapping itemsets into patterns
We use an algorithm for mining frequent patterns to iden-
tify the most and the least frequent (expected to be anoma-
lous) patterns of system behaviours. We describe such algo-
rithm in Section V-B1.
A. Input data for analysis
The initial, raw, dataset consists of 11 attributes. The given
attributes can be grouped in four semantic groups:
 time (Timestamp),
 type of action (Type of action, Aspect of action),
 action details (Message description, Start value, End
value),
 user (Username, User full name),
 location (Object path, Source, SCADA node)
Often the raw dataset consists of features that are redun-
dant, irrelevant or can even misguide mining results. This
is why we need to perform data preprocessing, analyse the
current feature set and select a suitable subset of attributes.
1) Attribute subset selection: Common approaches for
attribute selection exploit class labels to estimate informa-
tion gain of specific attribute (e.g., decision tree induction
[11]). Unfortunately, our dataset does not consist of class
labels (i.e., labels for normal and undesirable behaviour),
thus we cannot perform the “traditional” attribute evalu-
ation. However, some approaches may evaluate attributes
independently. For example, principal component analysis
(PCA) [11] searches for k n-dimensional orthogonal vectors
that can be used to represent the data. The original data
is thus projected into a much smaller space and represented
through principal components. The principal components are
sorted in the order of decreasing “significance”. Finally, the
dimensionality reduction is performed by discarding weaker
components, thus those with low variance. By performing
the PCA on our data, we discard two low variable attributes
(Start Value, End Value) since they only had one value in
the whole dataset. Also, we identify two redundant attributes
(Username and User full name). Thus we discard one of
them.
As expected, the attribute Timestamp showed the highest
variance. We aggregate this attribute in three working shifts.
We describe the details of this aggregation in Section V-C.
Now we try to understand the behaviour of the remaining
attributes.
Due to the fact that the highly variable attributes can pro-
duce overfitting [18], [29], we try to lower the number of
distinct values in the most variable attributes (in our con-
text, the ones over 150 distinct values- Object path, Source,
Message description). The attribute Object path represents
structured text. In Section V-C we describe the details of
generalising the values of this attribute.
The attribute Source represents an ID of the field or net-
work device and consists of around 350 different values.
This attribute is highly variable, but does not contribute to
the data mining process due to fact that it uniquely identifies
a device. For example, a creditcard number almost uniquely
identifies a customer and thus does not represent a useful
attribute to generalize customers behaviour thus to be used
in the data mining. Thus we omit this attribute from the
analysis. Similar to this, authors in [18], [23] perform de-
parameterisation of data by replacing IP addresses, memory
locations and digits by tokens.
The attribute Message description represents unstructured
text and consists of 280 values. We perform an in-depth
analysis of values to determine means of aggregation. We
conclude that a portion of values represents redundant data
to other attributes (e.g., information in Message description:
“Action A on source B is acknowledged by C” is repeated
already in the same entry by the attributes Type of action: A,
Source: B, User: C). The rest of messages are presented in
an inconsistent way and provide information which, at this
moment, we cannot parse and aggregate in a meaningful
way. An alternative approach would be unsupervised clus-
tering of messages, such as in [37]. Such clustering, how-
ever, does not guarantee semantic similarity of messages.
We believe that the remaining attributes can compensate the
information loss from this attribute. On the other hand, we
are sure that such highly variable attribute does not con-
tribute to the data generalisation. Thus we do not consider
this attribute during the analysis.
Our final set consists of 6 nominal attributes: Working
shift, Aspect of action, Type of action, Object path, User
account and SCADA node. Some attributes are not appli-
cable for all entries. As a result, every entry uses between
3 and 6 attributes. A SCADA node represents a computer
that sends event details to the log. In our case, there are
8 different nodes. All nodes in the network have a ded-
icated and predefined role that typically does not change
(e.g., there are 2 engineering workstations, 4 operator work-
stations and 2 connectivity servers). The attribute Type of
action takes one out of 12 nominal values. This attribute
describes the general type of action, such as: operator ac-
tion, configuration change, process simple event, network
message, etc. For types of action which are performed by
users, the attribute Aspect of action is applicable. This at-
tribute takes one out of 6 nominal values in the log and
details the character of the user action, such as: change of
workplace layout, change in workplace profile, etc. The at-
tribute Object path provides information about the location
of the device which is the object of the performed action
(e.g., plant1/control module/production/cleaning/access set-
tings/groups of devices/tanks). The attribute User account
represents the username of the signed-on user. Table IV
represents a sample of the analysed log.
Some events in the log are more severe than others. The
severity of a SCADA event depends on the combination
of attribute values. Thus, a correct evaluation of specific
attribute values can help to detect events that are undesir-
able for the normal process flow. For example, the value
AuditEventAcknowledge of the attribute Type of action is
semantically less important than the value AspectDirectory.
This is because the first value implies an action where an op-
erator acknowledged an alarm while the latter value implies
that a new action was performed on the main configuration
directory. Leveraging the stakeholders’ knowledge about the
process and the semantics of nominal attribute values can
help to distinguish critical and non critical events in the
complete log. In Section VI-B1 we describe how we use
Table IV
EXAMPLE OF A SIMPLIFIED SCADA LOG
W.
shift
Aspect
of action Type of action
Object
path
User
account
SCADA
node
2 - Process SimpleEvent - - CS01
2 Layoutchange
Configuration
change
Plant1 /
../ layout Engineer1 EN01
1 - Operator action Plant1 /../ tanks Operator2 OP03
this knowledge to improve our detection results.
2) Dataset validation: Our stakeholders argue that, at the
time of logging, there were no known security incidents.
We investigate the ways of validating this claim. We argue
that due to size and high dimensionality of the log, manual
inspection is infeasible. Thus a (semi)automated approach
is required. Typically, common log analysis tools imply the
usage of predefined rulesets which filter events out of logs.
For example, in [28], various rulesets for analysing logs,
such as syslog and ssh log, are maintained. Unfortunately,
such ruleset for analyzing SCADA system logs does not
exist. Thus we cannot perform a reliable log analysis to
establish the ground truth.
An alternative approach for establishing the ground truth
would imply the log capture in a controlled environment. In
reality, this means either (1) performing the log capture in a
lab setup or (2) performing the log capture in a constrained
real environment (e.g., by reducing the number of process
components to the ones that are validated to be correctly
working). We argue that neither of the cases can compare
to the actual real data.
We acknowledge that, lacking the notion of the ground
truth, we cannot perform an extensive discussion about false
negatives. We are aware of this shortcoming in our approach.
Nevertheless, the primary goal of our approach is to help op-
erators uncover security-related events from real data which
would be overlooked otherwise.
V. ARCHITECTURE
MELISSA consists of two interacting components: the
Data Preparator (DP) and the Pattern Engine (PE). Figure 6
depicts MELISSA and its internal components.
Figure 6. MELISSA architecture
A. Data Preparator
We perform data aggregation (e.g., variance reduction)
and transformation (e.g., value coding) on the dataset to
get a suitable data format for pattern mining. We describe
performed operation in Section V-C.
B. Pattern Engine
The PE runs the algorithm for mining frequent patterns
over log and outputs an ordered list of patterns based on the
frequency of the occurrence.
We now explain how we selected the specific implementa-
tion of the pattern mining algorithm. Patterns can be mined
for different purposes. Various algorithms, depending on the
purpose of mining, deliver itemsets with different features
(e.g., complete, closed, maximal).
To select the most suitable algorithm for mining frequent
patterns in our context, we identified a list of required fea-
tures. The requirements are as follows:
 maximal pattern mining,
 scalability,
 selection of interesting events based on the absolute
support count.
Maximal pattern mining: An itemset can be frequent
but not (necessarily) interesting and useful for stakeholders
in a specific context. Mining large frequent itemsets often
generates a huge number of itemsets satisfying the mini-
mum threshold. This is because, if an itemset is frequent,
each of its subsets is frequent as well. For example, for a
itemset of length 70, such as fa1, a2, ...,a70g, there would be 
70
1

=70 1-itemsets: a1, a2,..., a70,
 
70
2

2-itemsets: (a1; a2),
(a1; a3),..., (a69; a70), and so on. The total number of mined
itemsets, for a data set consisting of 70 items is 270 1. This
value is too big to be stored and used for manual inspection.
There are various strategies to extract a useful subset of
itemsets from the complete set. For our context, our stake-
holders agreed that no subset of attributes carries enough
semantics to distinguish between anomalous and normal
events. For example, it is not sufficient to describe an event
with only two attributes (e.g., itemset attributes fType of
action, User accountg; itemset instance fOperator action,
Operator 2g). Therefore, we set a requirement that the al-
gorithm should deliver output patterns which consist of as
many attributes as possible (take the superset itemset that
satisfies the minimum threshold). This type of mining is in
data mining terminology referred as mining maximal pat-
terns [11]. Formally, an itemset X is a maximal frequent
itemset in set S if X is frequent and there exists no super-
itemset Y such that XY and Y is frequent in S [11]. In our
context, a maximal itemset is one log entry consisting of all
applicable log attributes.
Scalability: For the cases when the same plant setup
is running for years, we might want to run the tool continu-
ously, and receive events as they occur. Thus, the tool needs
to scale well when processing logs that may consist of years
of plant work. The tool can then leverage the knowledge
of past behaviours to update the top patterns and detect
anomalies.
Also, the speed of processing is important as operators
must take immediate action in case of an alarm. There are
two main types of mining algorithms: 1) algorithms that use
candidate generation [1] and 2) algorithms that do not use
candidate generation (FP-growth algorithms) [11].
For mining a k-size itemset, an algorithm that uses candi-
date generation may need up to 2k scans of the dataset. By
contrast, an algorithm that does not use candidate generation
typically requires only two scans of the dataset to mine
itemsets of arbitrary size. These algorithms are based on
a recursive tree structure and are referred in the literature
as the FP-growth methods. During the data preparation, we
already scan the whole dataset several times. We expect our
log size to grow up to several million entries (e.g., around
2,500,000 entries correspond to the stakeholder’s annual sys-
tem logs). Also, benchmark results on a Frequent Itemset
Mining Implementation (FIMI) workshop [9] show that the
FP-growth methods scale better for most datasets. Therefore,
we choose to use an FP-growth algorithm to comply with
the scalability and speed requirements.
There are various implementations of the FP-growth
method [10], [6]. These algorithms implement different
structures to improve algorithm performances (e.g., in [10]
authors use array structures, in [6] authors use a bitmap
compression schema). We acknowledge one general problem
of the FP-growth methods. These algorithms may scale bad
with respect to memory consumption for small values of
minimum support count (i.e., the threshold for the frequency
of total occurrences). This is because a small value for the
minimum support count, depending on the dataset charac-
ter, may produce a large number of unique itemsets that
each need a separate tree branch. This results in a complex
FP-tree building and mining. However, with respect to our
context (a limited number of items to mine: number of users,
system nodes and a low number of different operations), we
believe that there will not be a significant growth in the total
number of items in our logs. Thus we expect the memory
consumption to remain in ranges of our initial experiments
when scaling up to millions of entries.
Selection of interesting events based on absolute sup-
port count: To distinguish between interesting and unin-
teresting itemsets, algorithms use the concept of “cut off”
parameter. For example, some algorithms use an absolute
minimum support count (e.g., consider an itemset frequent
if it appears at least 5 times in the dataset) while others
use a relative minimum support (e.g., consider an itemset
frequent if it appears in at least 10% of total dataset entries).
Some algorithms use top k ranking of patterns (e.g., consider
frequent if an itemset is in top 5 ranked patterns, and satis-
fies absolute minimum support). In our context, the output
produced by the algorithm is then inspected by security op-
erators. This implies that the number of extracted patterns
directly influences usability. Thus we believe that an abso-
lute support count with ranking suits our context better than
a relative support count. We determine the final “cut off”
parameter with stakeholders (discussed in Section VI-A).
An algorithm that meets most of our requirements is the
FP-growth algorithm by Grahne et al. [10].
In the next section, we describe the general concept of
the FP-growth algorithm.
1) FP-growth algorithm: The first dataset scan in an FP-
growth method finds and counts all individual items in the
dataset (Figure 7.A). The items found are inserted into the
header table in decreasing order of their count (Figure 7.B).
In the second scan, dataset entries are read and inserted in
the FP-tree as branches, where items represent tree nodes.
If an itemset shares some of the items with a branch pre-
viously inserted in the tree, then this part of tree will be
shared between entries. Every tree node holds a count which
represents the number of entries where the item occurs (with
considering preceding items).
After the second dataset scan, all entries are inserted in the
FP-tree. The header table holds links to tree nodes for each
item. For every item in the header table a conditional pattern
base and a conditional tree are built. The conditional pattern
base represents a list of tree paths that a given item (e.g.,
item F) appears in. This represents a new dataset restricted
for item F (Figure 7.C). The main algorithm is now repeated
on the restricted dataset. As a result, a new tree of paths is
built (Figure 7.D ). The branches of the tree that satisfy
minimum support count represent frequent patterns (Figure
7.E).
C. Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of MELISSA using
Java. Data aggregation operations gather and summarize data
for easier analysis. We transform the Timestamp attribute to
represent usual working shifts in the company. In this way
we aggregate a timeseries attribute into a 3-value discrete
format that is more suitable for mining workload patterns.
In our case, “working shift 1” covers all events occurring be-
tween 00:00 and 08:59hrs. “Working shift 2” includes events
occurring between 09:00 and 16:59hrs. “Working shift 3”
includes events occurring between 17:00 and 23:59hrs.
Also, we aggregate the attribute Object path. This attribute
is in the format of structured text and represents a hier-
archical tree of locations in the plant (both functional and
geographical). This tree represents a textual representation of
the AD task tree in SCADA control application. In practice,
the values of this attribute represent the “address path” of
a device where the event has taken place or, in case of a
configuration change, the system path of the change. The last
substring of the path represents the name of a device (e.g.,
plant1/functional mode/street1/pumps/pump3). To aggregate
Figure 7. FP growth algorithm:A) full dataset, B) building FP tree from
the dataset, C) extracted itemsets that preceed item F, D) building recursive
tree from the conditional base, E) extracted itemsets that satisfy minimum
support count
values, we take the substring of the tree path with up to and
excluding the leaves of the tree. This way we semantically
group together devices which are on the same location (or
configuration paths) and thus aggregate the original attribute
from 170 down to 36 nominal values.
Finally, for all nominal attributes in the dataset we code
distinct values as our algorithm only accepts numerical val-
ues.
In the Pattern Engine we use an algorithm for mining
maximal frequent patterns proposed in [10].
VI. BENCHMARKS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach we collected
a dataset of logs generated by the SCADA system of the
stakeholders, which processes waste, surface and drinking
water. The 101,025 log entries were collected during a 14
day period, and each log entry consists of at most 12 at-
tributes. The logs were captured with the default audit set
up of the SCADA system that collects events continuously
through time.
We use the subset of 6 log attributes that consist of 69
unique values (i.e., items). Since we aim at identifying the
least frequent patterns, our minimal support count is 1. This
means that each unique event which occurred at least once
represents a pattern.
A. Testing MELISSA
As a proof of concept, we run our analysis in ofline mode.
This means that a user runs a “day after” analysis. For exam-
ple, each day the user receives up to 20 least frequent events
from the day before (normally, in the stakeholder’s facility
under analysis, a user gets approximately 7,000 unclassified
events per day, so a reduction to 20 is significant). We decide
to run the analysis offline because:
 we were provided with only two weeks of system logs;
 we cannot claim that these two weeks represent a com-
plete set of behaviours that occur in the facility through
a year;
 water-related systems are considered as slow processes
(the consequences of actions are delayed - e.g., it takes
several hours to overload a tank even while pumping at
maximum speed), thus we can afford to run the analysis
with a delay.
This approach can detect silent mimicry attacks as operators
have a daily overview of events and can spot unusually infre-
quent user actions spread over several days (e.g., unplanned
configuration changes [18]).
B. Preliminary results
We first summarize the results of daily inspections.
MELISSA found 486 unique patterns from the 14 days
long SCADA log. The number of unique patterns per day
varies from 12 to 79. Also, the support count per day per
pattern varies from 1 to 1,151.
Figure 8. MELISSA testing, day 4 (before introducing semantic knowl-
edge)
According to our stakeholders, an acceptable level of us-
ability is that they receive up to 20 events per day for manual
inspection, with the exception that all events with a support
count of 1 should be reported. We use these requirements to
set the threshold for extracting the most interesting events.
After applying the threshold on the whole dataset, approxi-
mately 198 events (represented in 131 patterns) are labeled
for inspection. During the daily inspections, the stakeholders
label 20 patterns as suspicious. After having collected addi-
tional information about the context, the stakeholders finally
label 1 pattern as anomalous.
We now describe the context of the pattern which was
labelled as anomalous. Figure 8 represents a projection of
the pattern analysis from this day. The table consists of 8
columns. The first column represents the pattern support
count. The remaining columns represent the attributes used
in the analysis. The wavy horizontal line represents the bor-
der between interesting and uninteresting patterns as decided
by the stakeholders (maximum 20 events per day). On the
righthand side of the table, the stakeholders labeled each
pattern as either normal or anomalous (e.g., A1). For the
anomalous pattern, circles imply why the pattern is unusual.
Anomalous pattern A1 occurred only once (support count
is 1). Node EN01 represents an engineering workstation.
Shift 1 represents the night shift. For the stakeholders, A1 is
anomalous because engineers are expected to work only dur-
ing day shifts. While inspecting the complete log we found
that, except this event, all activities performed by engineers
or on engineering workstations did occur during day shifts
only. After a thorough internal inspection, the stakeholders
found a software emulator with a faulty automation script
that remotely attempted to connect to the EN01 engineering
workstation. We classify this event as an example of script-
ing threat (and thus an operational mistake of an engineer)
which could have effect on system performance, as other
actions could depend on it.
1) Introducing process knowledge: During the prelimi-
nary analysis of results we note a shortcoming of our ap-
proach. Currently, we assume that all events equally impact
the process. In reality, this is not true. When using the thresh-
old of 20 events per day, our stakeholders acknowledged
that in several cases some uncritical events were within the
threshold while some severe (and suspicious) events were
omitted due to the restriction on the number of selected
events per day. Therefore, we decide to include the process
knowledge to our algorithm and thus improve the quality of
results. We do this by implementing a loose ordering on the
algorithm output. The order is based on the process severity
of specific events. By applying the new order we perform a
fine-grained tuning of results so that the semantically more
severe patterns appear within the usability threshold while
less severe patterns (although with a low frequency of oc-
currence) tend to appear lower on the output list (and thus
appear to be less interesting). The loose order is defined
by evaluating the semantical meaning of values of one log
attribute.
To choose the suitable attribute, we perform a semi-
automated preselection of attributes. As we mentioned ear-
lier, not all attributes are used in all entries. Thus we assume
that only attributes used in the same entries as user actions
(i.e., performed on user workstations) are semantically im-
portant for detecting threats identified in Section III-A.
The preselected attributes are: Type of action, SCADA
node and Aspect of action. We asked the stakeholders to
compile the ranking of the values for each attribute. For
example, for the attribute Type of action the stakeholders
compiled the severity ranking list:
1) AspectDirectory,
2) Network message,
3) Operation,
4) Operator action,
5) AuditEvent Acknowledge.
Here, the order of the values implies how severe that
specific action for the process is. For example, an action
which includes AspectDirectory is more severe than Au-
ditEvent Acknowledge as explained in Section IV-A). We run
several experiments to generate different PE outputs using
the selected attributes and the compiled lists. For each list
we add weights to the attribute values. For example, we add
a negative weight to severe actions (to increase the chances
that the action is closer to the top of the pattern list) and
a positive weight for noncritical actions (to decrease the
chances that the action is close to the top of the pattern
list). We then submit the results to the stakeholders. The
stakeholders selected the attribute Type of action as the one
whose ranking performed the most useful results within the
extracted patterns. Thus we perform the final fine-grained
re-ordering based on the severity weights of this attribute.
Finally, we use the sum of support value and the severity
weight of each pattern entry to determine the final weighted
value which is used for the final ranking of patterns.
Figure 9. MELISSA testing, day 4 (after introducing process knowledge)
After providing the tuned results, the stakeholder labelled
two more patterns as anomalous. These patterns also appear
on day 4. Figure 9 shows the new ordering after introducing
the process knowledge.
We now explain the context of the anomalous patterns.
Anomalous patterns A2 and A3 occur twice. Node CS01 rep-
resents the primary Connectivity Server. Network message
item typically reports problems in the network communi-
cations. Operation item reports system responses to a user
action (such as input expression error messages, condition-
triggered procedures). The stakeholders evaluate patterns A2
and A3 as anomalous because these patterns reflect network
and operational errors on the main connection backbone
node (CS01). After a thorough internal inspection, the stake-
holders found out that all events from these two patterns
occurred in the same minute of day 4. User Engineer 1 was
logged in on CS01 during the time these errors happened.
The stakeholders assume that Engineer 1 inserted a value
which triggered an overflow in a device cache, which in
turn generated an error report from the system. We verify
that this is the only case, over two weeks of operations,
that error messages were triggered on Connectivity Servers.
The stakeholders classify these patterns as misconfiguration
threats where the user triggered cache overflows by inserting
unexpected values. We note that this kind of error (e.g., an
error reporting the input value is out of range) could be an
indication of a masquerade attack. For example, an attacker
with valid credentials would possibly be unaware of the
working ranges for specific devices. Thus he might insert
a value that would trigger a cache overflow which would be
logged.
In conclusion, by applying our tool, the stakeholders de-
tected and acknowledged three unexpected events. All de-
tected events relate to an undesirable engineer operation on
the system. These events could not be detected by applying
filters for various user actions (as discussed in Section IV).
In fact, the entries were only indirectly related to user op-
eration (and thus represent the consequence of an action, as
defined in Section IV). In our context, the actual action of
activating a script that generated anomalous event A1 oc-
curred before of the log capture time. Similarly, anomalous
events A2 and A3 represent propagated errors on devices
caused by a legitimate user action (which was logged and
initially cleared as normal by the stakeholders).
In the next section we discuss the usability of the tool.
2) Usability: Table V summarizes the output of the per-
formed log analysis through different phases. To inspect
system behaviour in a currently running SCADA system,
the users would have to look at individual events (a few
thousand per day). By transferring the level of analysis to
patterns, instead of individual events, we help stakeholders
in aggregating log information. To discard a large number of
uninteresting patterns, we perform frequency pattern analy-
sis. With the suggested “cut off” threshold, our stakeholders
receive for inspection 131 unique patterns in 14 days. The
number of patterns per day varies, but on average it is less
than 10. Finally, after context analysis of suspicious patterns
(i.e., an additional round of analyses on suspicious patterns),
we estimate that the user had to inspect in average 11 pat-
terns per day.
Table V
MELISSA RESULTS: SIZE OF INPUT LOGS, SIZE OF TOOL OUTPUT,
NUMBER OF FIRST AND SECOND STAKEHOLDERS’ INSPECTION
Full
log
For
inspection Suspicious Anomalous
number of
events 101,025 198 23 5
number of
patterns 450 131 20 3
Table VI
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ESTIMATION OF PROCESSING
ANNUAL LOGS
Dataset
information
SCADA
log “Accidents”
Estimated
annual
SCADA logs
number of instances 101,025 1,000,000 2,500,000
total number of items 69 500 70
avg size of itemsets 6 45 6
Data Preparator (s) 22.7 does not apply 1,080
Pattern mining (s) 0.97 100 200
Total MELISSA
processing time (s) 23.6 does not apply 1,280
3) System performance: Testing has been performed on
a machine with an Intel Core 2 CPU at 2.4GHz and 2Gb of
memory. Table VI shows runtime results of testing. The table
consists of three columns. The first column shows the results
of our testing on SCADA system logs. The second column
shows benchmark results of the pattern mining algorithm by
Grahne et al. [10] on the “Accidents” dataset [16]. We use
these results to estimate the runtime of the expected size of
system logs over a year (shown in the third column). The
complexity of the preprocessing is O(n). Scalability of the
used mining frequent patterns algorithm (in PE) is discussed
in [10]. To estimate MELISSA’s performances on an annual
SCADA log, we consider benchmarks of the pattern mining
algorithm of [10] on the “Accidents” dataset. We argue that
this dataset is more complex than the dataset we use, due
to the higher number of attributes. Thus, we take the results
from [10] as our worst case.
To summarize, we estimate that our tool would preprocess
and mine patterns in size of approximately one year of work
in the stakeholder facility in around 22 minutes.
4) Enhancing effectiveness and usability: While perform-
ing the preliminary log analysis, we identified two interest-
ing and challenging directions to improve the detection of
anomalous behaviours:
1) derive an automated method to identify patterns that
describe normal SCADA behaviour,
2) build a self-calibrating threshold to distinguish be-
tween regular and unexpected patterns.
The first direction implies that we can determine which
patterns occur with the same (or similar) frequency over
a longer period of time. By knowing this, we can build
a profile of normal behaviour in the SCADA system over
time [35]. For example, we can determine a set of patterns
that are regular in their presence and frequency. If a pat-
tern suddenly changes his “regularity”, this can imply that
a mimicry attack is taking place. On the other hand, if a
regular pattern becomes less frequent, this can imply that a
device is malfunctioning or has been reconfigured. Similarly,
an operator can use the results of the rare pattern mining to
compile rules for alerting similar events. This way the usual
alarming system could be improves. By inferring models of
normal and anomalous behaviour we can compile rules and
thus turn our tool into an online mode.
The second direction addresses the shortcoming of the
manually-set output threshold in our solution. Currently
MELISSA delivers up to 20 least frequent patterns to the
security expert, by taking into account the process knowl-
edge. We acknowledge that there are drawbacks in this ap-
proach. For example, during a heavy workload day (e.g., a
plant temporary increases the work flow to cover a larger
area), applying this threshold can cause that some, poten-
tially important patterns, are omitted. By contrast, during a
low workload day, a number of semantically uninteresting
patterns might be unnecessarily reported to the expert.
Having these in mind, we performed an additional anal-
ysis of the derived frequencies of event patterns. Our goal
was to investigate if logs contain traces of regular behaviour.
Indeed, we discovered that logs do present certain reg-
ularities. For each day in the log, there is a “gap” which
divides patterns with low and high frequency of occurrence.
For example, Figure 10 shows an ordered list of pattern
frequencies for day 6 of the analysed log. The first column
in the table presents an ordered list of frequency support
values. At the top of the list there are patterns with low fre-
quency of occurrences. These patterns are then followed by
patterns with a significantly higher frequency of occurrence.
Interestingly, there is a “gap” in values between patterns with
low and high frequency. We call the value that differentiates
these groups of patterns as the “natural threshold”. Together
with the stakeholders we investigate the character of patterns
on the list. The stakeholders agreed that bellow the “natural
threshold” there are no events which can be interesting for
security purposes. We argue that these patterns represent
automated system (re)actions and periodical updates which
are time-triggered and potentially inter-dependant (one event
triggers another one(s)). For example, some patterns always
occur with the same frequency over days. After analysing
two weeks of log, we found out that the pattern with the
type of action Services typically occurs 420 times per one
working shift (Figure 10). For this, we suspect that the sys-
tem is configured so that devices are sending time-triggered
messages signaling the online status.
In [30] authors show that observed failures in logs tend
to be described in many log entries that occur consecutively
forming repetitive patterns. We verified that the high fre-
quent patterns that we observed are not such burst of events
and are spread through the whole day.
Because of this we believe that the analysis of the log over
a longer period of time can provide interesting insights in the
content of the logs. For example, we could extract patterns
that are present on every day, and occur with the same (or
similar) frequency of occurrence. These observations would
define a profile of regular SCADA behaviour.
Figure 10. Day 6 pattern analysis
According to the stakeholders, the patterns above the “nat-
ural threshold” represent potentially interesting patterns for
the inspection. These patterns are “incidental”. They consist
of regular (but unfrequent) user actions and potentially sus-
picious events. The threshold value varies for different days
in the log. Figure 11 shows how the “gap” between patterns
of low and high frequency changes over the second week in
the log. For some days in the log (e.g., day 13 and 14) it
seems easy to determine the threshold between “incidental”
and regular patterns. However, for other days (e.g., day 11)
it is hard to decide where the threshold is. Thus we argue
that the threshold value should be determined dynamically.
After inspecting the summarised SCADA log, we argue
that there are regularities which are suitable for building a
self-calibrating pattern output threshold. Also, we believe
that the log contains a number of patterns that describe
normal plant work. Unfortunately, at this stage we cannot
confirm our intuitions in a mathematically sound way. This
is due to the fact that we only have two weeks of plant logs,
which is a short time in process life or a stabile system, such
as SCADA facility.
Nevertheless, we believe that these observations should
be further investigated. Also, we believe that the evidences
found in the logs further corroborate the paradigm that
SCADA facilities are stable and repetitive environments
[34].
As a final observation, we acknowledge the difficulty of
mining a log which is provided in an unstructured man-
ner. We remark that the SCADA logs are structured better
Figure 11. Frequency of pattern occurrences over one week of SCADA
log
than some other types of logs, such as telecommunication
system [29], console logs [37]. However, in Section IV-A
we decide to omit one attribute (Message description) from
the analysis due to the redundant, unstructured and highly
variable character. Although we believe that we did not loose
(significantly) on the data quality by doing so, we acknowl-
edge a concern that such solution in general may represent a
tradeoff. A solution for this would be a log with structured
information. Such log could easily be parsed into various
(and consistent) attributes, become computer-readable and
thus decrease the uncertainty about inferring important in-
formation.
5) Limitations of the approach: We now describe the
limitations of our approach.
Firstly, there is a threat scenario in which the SCADA logs
could be corrupted. For example, attacks performed on the
devices in the field can produce erroneous input data for the
SCADA application and cause the generation of logs (and
automated actions) which do not reflect the real situation
in the field. Also, an attacker might manage to gain higher
privileges (e.g., by exploiting a system-related vulnerability)
and then prevent recording or erase some log entries. These
attacks cannot be detected by observing SCADA logs, since
the log no longer represents a consistent data resource. For
detecting these kinds of attacks, a complementary analysis
of network data or field measurement is necessary.
Secondly, an important limitation of our approach is the
possibility for an attacker to evade the detection by repeating
the same command a number of times. To overcome this,
we propose to enlarge the “knowledge window” and so learn
what are normal patterns of behaviour over a longer period
of time, as described in Section VI-B4. Since our current log
capture is limited, we could not have implemented this yet.
This also applies to the limitation of the currently manually-
set output threshold.
Thirdly, our approach for introducing the process knowl-
edge highly depends (and thus can be biased) on the stake-
holders’s knowledge about the specific process. We acknowl-
edge that we cannot do anything to overcome this fact
(because attribute values are nominative and thus human-
readable only).
Finally, our approach cannot provide reasoning to the op-
erator about the character of a suspicious event (e.g., “This
event is suspicious because user A never worked from node
B”). Generally, all anomaly-based approaches have the same
limitation. This is because the model of normal (i.e., ex-
pected) behaviour is typically described by a combination
of attributes (i.e., implicitly). By inferring rules from the
model, this limitation can be partly addressed. For example,
by applying the algorithm for mining association rules to the
identified patterns we can compile rules whose interpretation
is more readable to humans.
6) Approach generalisation: In this section we discuss
the possibilities and the difficulties of applying our approach
to other SCADA environments. We distinguish two different
problems: (1) applying the threat analysis and (2) applying
the log processing.
First, we acknowledge that the deviations identified during
the threat analysis are compiled from the tailored Aspect
Directory of a specific SCADA application. Thus the set of
undesirable user actions is not universal. This is because,
due to the nature of plant process, a set of undesirable
actions in one environment might only be a subset of all
undesirable actions in another environment. However, after
the discussion with the stakeholder from four different fa-
cilities (two water treatment, one gas distribution and one
power distribution company), we believe that the proposed
approach is transferable.
In Section III-A2 we identify several application and
practice vulnerabilities which illustrate that the identified
process-related threats can endanger the control system. A
security report by the U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) [25]performed on 18 different control systems
identified similar vulnerabilities as we did. This confirms
that the undesirable actions identified in Section III pose
legitimate threats to various facilities across the domain, thus
our knowledge is transferable.
Second, we believe that the log processing cannot be gen-
eralised. This is because log content and log format may
differ in applications of various vendors. However, under
the condition that the parsed log is either (1) provided by
the vendor or (2) inferred during the mining process, and
does represent a continuous SCADA monitoring log, we
hypothesize that our approach is applicable. We base this on
the knowledge that SCADA typically represents a “chatty”
systems whose main task is process monitoring (and thus
it continuously communicates with its components). There-
fore, we expect the logs to be continuous in other environ-
ments also.
We plan to test our hypotheses presented here in the future
work.
VII. RELATED WORK
Traditional methodologies for addressing safety problems
in process control systems (e.g., FMEA, FTA, HAZOP [8])
do not consider security threats. By introducing a special
set of guidewords, Winther et al. [36] show how HAZOP
can be extended to identify security threats. Srivantakul et
al. [33] combine HAZOP study with UML use case diagrams
to identify potential misuse scenarios in computer systems.
We take a similar approach to combine PHEA study with
HAZOP and analyse user (engineer) behaviour in a SCADA
environment.
To detect anomalous behaviour in SCADA systems, au-
thors use approaches based on inspecting network traffic
[2], validating protocol specifications [4], and analysing data
readings [19]. Process-related attacks typically cannot be
detected by observing network traffic or protocol specifi-
cations in the system. We argue that to detect such attacks
one needs to analyse data passing through the system [2],
[5] and include a semantic understanding of user actions.
Bigham et al. [5] use periodical snapshots of power load
readings in a power grid system to detect if a specific load
snapshot significantly varies from expected proportions. This
approach is efficient because it reflects the situation in the
process in a case of an attack. However, data readings (such
as power loads) give a low-level view on the process and do
not provide user traceability data.
Authors in [30] discuss the difficulties in processing logs
with unstructured format. In [18] authors present an ap-
proach for failure prediction in an enterprise telephony sys-
tem. Authors propose to use context knowledge for efficient
process visualization and failure prediction.
Several researches explore pattern mining of various logs
for security purposes (e.g., alarm logs in [15], [20], sys-
tem calls in [17], event logs in [12]). These authors use
pattern mining on burst of alarms to build episode rules.
However, pattern mining can sometimes produce irrelevant
and redundant patterns, as shown in [15]. We use pattern
mining algorithms to extract the most and the least frequent
event patterns from SCADA log.
In [21] authors propose to combine various log resources
in a process control environment to detect intrusions. The
detection is operator-assisted. To the best of our knowledge,
only Balducelli et al. [2] analyse SCADA logs to detect un-
usual behaviour. There, the authors use case-base reasoning
to find sequences of events that do not match sequences of
normal behaviour (from the database of known cases). The
authors analyse sequences of log events that originate from
a simulated testbed environment. In contrast, we analyse
individual logs from a real SCADA facility.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We analyse process-related threats that occur in the com-
puter systems used in critical infrastructures. Such threats
take place when an attacker manages to gain valid user
credentials and performs actions to alter/disrupt a targeted
industrial process, or when a legitimate user makes an op-
erational mistake and causes a process failure.
Currently no control (e.g., monitoring tools) is available
to mitigate process-related threats. To detect process-related
threats, logs could be analysed. These logs hold critical in-
formation for incident identification, such as user activities
and process status. However, system logs are rarely pro-
cessed due to 1) the large number of entries generated daily
by systems and 2) a general lack of the security skills and
resources (time).
We propose an analysis tool that extracts non-frequent
patterns, which are expected to be the result of an anomalous
events such a undesirable user actions. We benchmarked the
tool with real logs from a water treatment facility. Although
no real security incident occurred in the log we took into
account, at least five events were labelled by the stakeholders
as anomalous. We believe that SCADA logs represent an
interesting data resource which gives a new perspective on
SCADA behaviour. We argue that the analysis of SCADA
log represents a complement to the traditional security mit-
igation strategies.
As future work, we aim at expanding our tool to ad-
dress anomalous sequences of actions, rather than single
events/operations.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant. Fast algorithms for mining asso-
ciation rules in large databases. In Jorge B. Bocca, Matthias
Jarke, and Carlo Zaniolo, editors, Proc. 20th International
Conference on VLDB, pages 487–499. Morgan Kaufmann,
1994.
[2] C. Balducelli, L. Lavalle, and G. Vicoli. Novelty detection
and management to safeguard information-intensive critical
infrastructures. Int. J. Emergency Management, 4(1):88–103,
2007.
[3] K. Begnum and M. Burgess. Principle components and im-
portance ranking of distributed anomalies. Machine Learning,
58:217–230, February 2005.
[4] C. Bellettini and J. Rrushi. Vulnerability analysis of SCADA
protocol binaries through detection of memory access taint-
edness. In LTC John Hill, editor, Proc. 8th IEEE SMC In-
formation Assurance Workshop, pages 341–348. IEEE Press,
2007.
[5] J. Bigham, D. Gamez, and N. Lu. Safeguarding SCADA
systems with anomaly detection. In Proc. 2nd International
Workshop on Mathematical Methods, Models and Architec-
tures for Computer Network Security, LNCS 2776, pages
171–182. Springer Verlag, 2003.
[6] D. Burdick, M. Calimlim, J. Flannick, J. Gehrke, and T. Yiu.
MAFIA: A maximal frequent itemset algorithm. IEEE Trans-
actions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 17:1490–1504,
2005.
[7] L. Burns, J.L. Hellerstein, S. Ma, C.S. Perng, D.A. Raben-
horst, and D.J. Taylor. Towards discovery of event correlation
rules. In Proc. IEEE/IFIP International Symposium on Inte-
grated Network Management, pages 345 –359, 2001.
[8] F.P.Lees. Less’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries.
Butterworth-Heinemann, 3 edition, 2005.
[9] B. Goethals and M. Zaki, editors. FIMI ’03, Frequent Itemset
Mining Implementations, Florida, USA, volume 90 of CEUR
Workshop Proceedings, 2003.
[10] G. Grahne and J. Zhu. Fast algorithms for frequent itemset
mining using FP-Trees. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge
and Data Engineering, 17:1347–1362, 2005.
[11] J. Han and M. Kamber. Data mining concepts and techniques.
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2 pap edition, 2006.
[12] J. L. Hellerstein, S. Ma, and C.-S. Perng. Discovering action-
able patterns in event data. IBM Syst. J., 41:475–493, July
2002.
[13] J. Hieb, J. Graham, and J. Guan. An ontology for identify-
ing cyber intrusion induced faults in process control systems.
In Charles Palmer and Sujeet Shenoi, editors, Critical In-
frastructure Protection III, volume 311 of IFIP Advances in
Information and Communication Technology, pages 125–138.
Springer Boston, 2009.
[14] Ponemon Institute. State of it security: Study of utilities and
energy companies, 2011. http://q1labs.com/resource-center/
white-papers.aspx.
[15] K. Julisch and M. Dacier. Mining intrusion detection alarms
for actionable knowledge. In Proc. 8th ACM SIGKDD inter-
national conference on Knowledge discovery and data min-
ing, KDD ’02, pages 366–375, New York, NY, USA, 2002.
ACM.
[16] T. Brijs K. Geurts, G. Wets and K. Vanhoof. Profiling high
frequency accident locations using association rules. In Proc.
82nd Annual Transportation Research Board, Washington DC
(USA), pages 123–130. Transportation Research Board, 2003.
[17] W. Lee and S. Stolfo. Data mining approaches for intrusion
detection. In Proc. 7th conference on USENIX Security Sym-
posium - Volume 7, pages 6–6, Berkeley, CA, USA, 1998.
USENIX Association.
[18] N. Lim, N. Singh, and S. Yajnik. A log mining approach to
failure analysis of enterprise telephony systems. In Proc. the
IEEE International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks With FTCS and DCC, pages 398 –403, june 2008.
[19] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. Reiter. False data injection attacks
against state estimation in electric power grids. In Proc. 16th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security,
CCS ’09, pages 21–32, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[20] S. Manganaris, M. Christensen, D. Zerkle, and K. Hermiz. A
data mining analysis of RTID alarms. Comput. Netw., 34:571–
577, October 2000.
[21] M. Naedele and O. Biderbost. Human-assisted intrusion
detection for process control systems. Accepted for 2nd
Int. Conf. on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
(ACNS), 2004.
[22] N. Hari Narayanan and N. Viswanadham. A methodology
for knowledge acquisition and reasoning in failure analysis of
systems. Systems, Man and Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions
on, 17(2):274 –288, march 1987.
[23] A. Oliner and J. Stearley. What supercomputers say: A study
of five system logs. In Proc. 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP Inter-
national Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks,
pages 575 –584, june 2007.
[24] V. Paxson. Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in
real-time. Comput. Netw., 31:2435–2463, December 1999.
[25] Control Systems Security Program. Common cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in industrial control systems. U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, 2011.
[26] R. Rantala. Cybercrime against businesses. Technical report,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C., 2004.
[27] A. Rege-Patwardhan. Cybercrimes against critical infrastruc-
tures: a study of online criminal organization and techniques.
Criminal Justice Studies, 22(3):261–271, Sep 2009.
[28] J. Rouillard. Real-time log file analysis using the simple event
correlator (sec). In Proc. 18th USENIX conference on System
administration, pages 133–150, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2004.
USENIX Association.
[29] F. Salfner and S. Tschirpke. Error log processing for accu-
rate failure prediction. In Proc. 1st USENIX conference on
Analysis of system logs, WASL’08, pages 4–4, Berkeley, CA,
USA, 2008. USENIX Association.
[30] F. Salfner, S. Tschirpke, and M. Malek. Comprehensive
logfiles for autonomic systems. In Proc. 18th International
Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing, page 211,
april 2004.
[31] W.T. Shaw. Cybersecurity for SCADA systems. PennWell
Corp., 2006.
[32] J. Slay and M. Miller. Lessons learned from the maroochy wa-
ter breach. In Eric Goetz and Sujeet Shenoi, editors, Critical
Infrastructure Protection, volume 253 of IFIP International
Federation for Information Processing, pages 73–82. Springer
Boston, 2007.
[33] T. Srivatanakul, J. Clark, and F. Polack. Effective security
requirements analysis: Hazop and use cases. In In Information
Security: 7th International Conference, LNCS 3225, pages
416–427. Springer, 2004.
[34] K. Stouffer, J. Falco, and K. Scarfone. Guide to Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) Security, NIST Special Publication
800-82. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011.
[35] R. Vaarandi. Tools and technigues for event log analysis. PhD
thesis, Tallinn University of Technology, 2005.
[36] R. Winther, O. Johnsen, and B. Gran. Security assessments
of safety critical systems using hazops. In SAFECOMP ’01:
Proc. 20th International Conference on Computer Safety, Re-
liability and Security, LNCS 2187, pages 14–24, London, UK,
2001. Springer-Verlag.
[37] W. Xu, L. Huang, A. Fox, D. Patterson, and M. Jordan.
Mining console logs for large-scale system problem detec-
tion. In Proc. 3rd conference on Tackling computer systems
problems with machine learning techniques, SysML’08, pages
4–4, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008. USENIX Association.
